what can congress do to end election meddling

Amer­ic­ans are concerned nigh the continu­ing threat of foreign inter­fer­ence in U.S. elec­tions. Although Russi­a'southward 2016 exploits have received much atten­tion, intel­li­gence agen­cies and national secur­ity experts warn that nosotros are likely to face addi­tional inter­fer­ence in our elec­tions from a greater number of adversar­ies going frontward. What can exist done? At that place is no silvery bullet. Tack­ling this prob­lem requires a range of nuanced solu­tions that simul­tan­eously preserve the integ­rity of U.S. elec­tions, protect the consti­tu­tional rights of all Amer­ic­ans, and leave suffi­cient room for bene­fi­cial inter­na­tional exchanges. In this analysis, we detail a card of fundamental recom­mend­a­tions to combat illi­cit foreign meddling in U.S. campaigns. Together with meas­ures to rein­force the secur­ity of our elec­tion infra­struc­ture, we believe these reforms will go a long way towards rein­for­cing U.Due south. sover­eignty in a fashion consist­ent with bedrock Amer­ican values.

Here is an over­view of the reforms that should be imple­men­ted to limit foreign inter­fer­ence:

Campaign Finance Reforms

• Shore up rules govern­ing online polit­ical advert­ising past passing the Honest Ads Deed. Paid ad­ise­ments were cent­ral to the disin­class­a­tion entrada launched by Russia during the 2016 elec­tion. Many paid commu­nic­a­tions like these, designed to increase tensions over divis­ive issues and depress voter turnout, are not prohib­ited by U.S. police or subject to the even most basic trans­par­ency require­ments. The Honest Ads Act would help address this prob­lem by enhan­cing disclos­ure for polit­ical ads on online plat­forms.
• Stop dark coin. By way of "night money"—spend­ing past groups not required by federal law to disclose their donor­southward—­for­eign sources, includ­ing govern­ments, tin can fund campaigns without the public know­ing. The Disclose Act would elim­in­ate this issue by requir­ing groups that engage in campaign spend­ing to reveal the donors who financed that activ­ity.
• Improve advert­ise­ment disclaim­ers. In addi­tion to the disclaimer provi­sions included in the Honest Ads Human activity, Congress should set clearer guidelines for "paid for" disclaim­ers in all advert­ise­ments. Disclaim­ers should exist required to identify or link to inform­a­tion about the indi­vidu­als respons­ible for fund­ing the advertising, such equally the top 5 donors to a super PAC or 501(c)(iv).
• Restrict foreign corpor­a­tions from spend­ing money on U.Southward. campaigns. While foreign indi­vidu­als and entit­ies are prohib­ited from spend­ing money on U.S. elec­tions, current rules permit strange compan­ies to spend through U.S. subsi­di­ar­ies, provided the company puts spend­ing decisions in the nominal hands of a U.S. denizen employee. Congress should close this loop­hole by specify­ing that substan­tial foreign owner­ship or command of a visitor is an abso­lute bar to spend­ing on U.S. campaigns.
• Clarify and strengthen rules govern­ing campaigns' receipt of strange intel­li­gence and other things of value from foreign govern­ments. The Mueller Report ques­tioned whether intel­li­gence offered by strange govern­ments falls under the defin­i­tion of an in-kind contri­bu­tion. Nonetheless federal law defines campaign contri­bu­tions to include any "affair of value" donated to influ­ence a federal elec­tion. Congress should make abso­lutely clear that U.S. campaigns may not soli­cit or receive whatever donated bene­fit from a foreign govern­ment or polit­ical political party, regard­less of the bene­fit's monet­ary value. Congress should also provide that any shar­ing of nonpub­lic campaign inform­a­tion with a foreign govern­ment or other foreign national volition be deemed a soli­cit­a­tion of a prohib­ited contri­bu­tion.
• Permit national parties to pay for cyber­se­cur­ity upgrades for aboveboard­ates. Email hacks and leaks were key to Russi­a's inter­fer­ence in the 2016 elec­tions. Campaigns must have access to the latest cyber­se­cur­ity tech­no­logy going forrard. If the govern­ment cannot comprehend the costs of these enhance­ments, then Congress should amend federal entrada finance rules to allow national party commit­tees to pay for cyber­se­cur­ity updates for their aboveboard­ates without these payments count­ing towards other­wise applic­able contri­bu­tion and spend­ing limits.
• Fix the FEC. Many of the electric current vulner­ab­il­information technology­ies in the campaign finance arrangement result from legal loop­holes created by grid­lock at the Federal Elec­tion Commis­sion. No new laws passed by Congress volition be effect­ive if the bureau charged with inter­pret­ing and enfor­cing them is chron­ic­ally incap­able of doing its job. The Bren­nan Center has proposed an over­haul to the agency that would be essen­tial to protect­ing elec­tions against foreign meddling.

Plat­class Trans­par­ency

• Make plat­forms account­able for expos­ing decept­ive foreign polit­ical influ­ence oper­a­tions and report on their efforts. Plat­forms like Face­book and Twit­ter accept already uncovered networks of fake accounts orches­trated by foreign govern­ments and spread­ing propa­ganda through unpaid posts. We recom­mend policy makers explore whether plat­forms should exist required to search for such content and publicly study what they find. Any crave­ment that burdens users' speech should exist under­taken using clear, publicly avail­able criteria and accom­pan­ied by a robust appeal process.
• Explore greater bot trans­par­ency and restric­tions. Bots, or social media accounts post­ing auto­mated content produced past computer programs, have been used to under­mine elec­tions. Posing as humans, these auto­mated accounts can make certain letters or accounts announced more popu­lar than they actu­ally are. Policy makers should invest­ig­ate ways to mitig­ate the decept­ive ability of bots, includ­ing disclaimer rules that require bots to be labeled every bit such.

Voting Reforms

• Pass the Decept­ive Prac­tices and Voter Intim­id­a­tion Preven­tion Human activity. A key goal of Russian inter­fer­ence in the 2016 elec­tions was to discour­historic period people from voting, espe­cially African Amer­ic­ans, by dissem­in­at­ing lies nearly how to vote. Congress urgently needs to brand information technology a crime for any histrion, strange or domestic, to spread disin­form­a­tion with the intent of suppress­ing the vote.
• Restrict the utilise of voter data for ad target­ing. Microtar­go­ing in online advert­ising allows polit­ical oper­at­ives to say differ­ent things to differ­ent demo­graph­ics, as the Russi­ans did in 2016. Data from land elec­tion offi­cials' voter files tin facil­it­ate this form of decep­tion. The use of voter file information should exist restric­ted, includ­ing by disclos­ing to ad audi­ences when they are targeted based on information from a voter file.

Other Reforms

• Modern­ize FARA. The Foreign Agents Regis­tra­tion Act (FARA), which imposes public regis­tra­tion and report­ing require­ments on agents of any strange prin­ciple enga­ging in polit­ical and certain other activ­it­ies in the U.s.a., should be over­hauled to enhance trans­par­ency and public account­ab­il­ity. Changes should include allow­ing for civil enforce­ment of FARA in cases that do non warrant crim­inal prosec­u­tion; alloc­at­ing far more than resources for both crim­inal and ceremonious enforce­ment; and elim­in­at­ing the registered anteroom­ist loop­hole.
• Require more than trans­par­ency from FARA-registered media entit­ies. Foreign govern­ment-controlled media outlets registered under FARA should as well exist required to add disclaim­ers to their commu­nic­a­tions.
• Require campaigns to study strange govern­ment contacts. The Mueller Study details the number of times Russia attemp­ted to inter­fere in the 2016 pres­id­en­tial elec­tion past offer­ing assist­ance to the Trump campaign, all of which remained hidden from both the public and law enforce­ment until subsequently the elec­tion. Campaigns should exist required to disclose all cred­ible offers of aid­ance or collab­or­a­tion from a foreign govern­ment or polit­ical party to the FEC and the FBI.
• Provide a stat­utory mandate for address­ing disin­form­a­tion and coordin­at­ing federal efforts. Several federal agen­cies are simul­tan­eously work­ing to address strange disin­form­a­tion. Congress should consol­id­ate and coordin­ate this piece of work by assign­ing respons­ib­il­ity to address strange disin­form­a­tion direc­ted at U.Due south. audi­ences to the Depart­ment of Home­land Secur­ity and clarify the roles of other involved agen­cies.
• Promote media liter­acy and civic educa­tion. Amer­ic­ans of all ages demand to be better educated regard­ing media liter­acy. Lessons should exist incor­por­ated in grade-schoolhouse and mail service-second­ary curricula, public service announce­ments, plat­forms' user outreach, and media cover­historic period.

To read the full Bren­nan Center agenda, click here.

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The follow­ing Bren­nan Centre experts are avail­able for addi­tional consulta­tion:

Daniel I. Weiner, Senior Coun­sel, Demo­cracy Program

Ian Vandewalker, Senior Coun­sel, Demo­cracy Program

Spen­cer P. Boyer, Director, Wash­ing­ton Function

Lawrence Norden, Managing director, Elec­tion Reform Plan, Demo­cracy Program

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Source: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/limiting-foreign-meddling-us-campaigns

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